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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC #5053-83 12 July 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM :		
•	Assistant National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE	
THROUGH:	NIO/USSR-EE	
SUBJECT :	The Administration Posture Toward the Russian People	

- My 8 June memorandum to you addressed two basic points: getting the President access to Soviet TV and the type of message we should deliver. Even though time was too short to work out a Presidential address on Soviet TV, the US is taking steps to improve our communications to the Soviet people: we are working to expand the capability of our radio stations and we are envisioning asking for USG access to Soviet TV in a new cultural exchange agreement to be negotiated. I naturally recommend that these initiatives be pursued vigorously. In this memorandum I wish to address the type of message we should be sending out in official USG statements and suggest that you discuss these ideas at one of your sessions with Judge Clark. (Proposed talking points are attached.)
- I believe our guiding principle should be always to make a differentiation between the people and the government. We are, of course, doing this in the Nationalities Policy we are developing for use with the ethnic minorities in the USSR. I believe we must also do this for the Russians who constitute about one half of the Soviet population. That differentiation between the people and the government should be kept particularly in mind in the preparation of high-level US statements. We should not be calling for a revolt but we should make it clear that we recognize the distinction between people and the government. In that way we can attempt to retain the Russian people as a potential ally in our attempts to complicate or change Soviet policies which are dangerous for US and not beneficial to the Russian people themselves.
- The explicitness of the differentiation will have to vary according to the primary recipient of the message and the medium used for delivery. Thus, in official statements to the Soviet government or in US statements allowed on Soviet TV, our differentiation message must be implicit, but it should still be there. For instance, when talking about arms control

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negotiations we can note our conviction that Russian people want peace; or, in discussing the possibility of mutual cooperation, we can allude to the courage shown by the Russian people in World War II. In statements by US officials dealing with the Soviet problem but addressed to US audiences we should be more forthright -- and have the radio stations transmit the statement to the USSR later. For instance, on the appropriate occasion, the President may wish to pay tribute to an exiled Russian cultural figure, say the conductor Rostropovich or the writer Aksyonov, both of whom were and remain very popular figures in Russia. In talking about these or other Russians, the President could note that we welcome these cultural giants to our country but regret that the repressive Soviet policies here forced these best sons of Russia to leave their homeland. Or, on some religious occasion, the US could give recognition to the Orthodox religion -- barely allowed but acquiring new importance in the USSR -- as embodying the conscience of the Russian nation and pay particular tribute to any religious figures who have recently been persecuted by the government. Or, in talking about the military competition between our two countries, the US can refer to our wish that we could implement the peace program of a true Russian nationalist --Academician Sakharov - but note his advice that, failing a change of policy on the part of the Soviet Government, the US must be ready to defend itself by all means at its disposal. Other examples can be given but the important thing is to think in these terms and to look for occasions on which to present these messages.

- 4. Beyond declarations, we could take one expenseless action to show Russians that we see them as a nation distinct from their current government: We could give official recognition to some giants of Russian culture (e.g., Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky) by commemorating them in stamps and then publicizing the fact through our radio stations. Preferably, this recognition could come either in a stamp series devoted to Russian writers and composers but it could also come as part of an international series. In either case the point would be to show our esteem for the Russian nation.
- 5. The nice thing about these proposals is that they are free. All they require is that we think of the Russian people as a potential ally in our struggle against Soviet dictatorship and expansionism.
- 6. In discussing this concept with John Lenczowski of the NSC staff, I learned that he had written a long memorandum on it to Judge Clark. You may want to refer to it in any discussion you may have with Judge Clark.

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Attachment: Proposed Talking Points

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#### ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: Proposed Talking Points for DCI in Meeting with Judge Clark on the Administration Posture Toward the Russian People

- 1. Glad you found idea of Presidential address to the Soviet people of interest and trust it will be kept under consideration.
- 2. Fully support current work designed to bolster radio stations and to gain access to Soviet media through new cultural exchange agreement.
- 3. Believe that in addressing the Soviet Union, we should always make differentiation between people and government.
- 4. In diplomatic exchanges with Soviet Government, differentiation must be implicit. For instance, when talking about arms control negotiations with Soviet government we can express our full confidence in desire of Russian people for peace.
- 5. In statements to US audiences, which can and should be transmitted to USSR by our radio stations, differentiation should be much more explicit. For instance, we can pay tribute to some exiled Russian cultural figure and express sorrow that repressive Soviet policies forces these best sons of Russia to leave their homeland.
- 6. We could also commemorate Russian cultural figures in US stamps, either as part of a strictly Russian series or as part of an international series.
- 7. The main point is that, in all we say or do, we think of the Russian people not as one with their government but rather as a potential ally in our struggle against Soviet dictatorship and expansionism.
- 8. I understand that John Lenczowski of your staff has been working on some similar ideas. He can probably spearhead any effort to put them into practice.

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\* DCI/NIC/A/NIO/USSR-EE/ b, 12 Jul 83

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